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Abstract 
 
In law, the category of reasonableness, when used in a “strong sense”, is inherently lied 
up with proportionality, and also with the test of necessity, and thus is a guarantee of a 
minimal restriction of constitutional rights compatible with the attainment of a given 
purpose. This approach to the scrutiny of restrictions of constitutional rights carries 
certain disadvantages because of an unfortunate alignment of the judicial role with the 
role of legislator, but it also has some great advantages when compared with alternative 
approaches: it is more transparent when it comes to revealing to the public all the 
ingredients of the judicial calculus, and most importantly, it reduces the sense of defeat 
for the losing party. As such, it is consensus-oriented because it acknowledges explicitly 
that there are valid constitutional arguments on both sides. In turn in political 
philosophy the notion of reasonableness applies to the determination of the standards of 
justifications for authoritative decisions so that they can be considered legitimate, i.e. 
calling for respect even from those subjected to them who do not agree with them on 
merits. The attractiveness of this idea results from the fact that it combines two 
enormously popular traditions in democratic theory: those of social contract and of 
deliberative democracy. So it can be seen that both these conceptions: reasonableness in 
law and reasonableness in political theory have some obvious commonalities at the level 
of their deep justifications; both appeal to liberal, egalitarian and consensus-oriented 
values. 
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The concept of “reasonableness” is deeply engrained both in legal theory and in 
political philosophy. In the former, jurisprudential arguments about reasonableness are 
informed by the growing use of this category in international law, in European law, and 
also in national legal orders, in particular in constitutional and administrative law of 
many countries. In the latter, i.e. in political philosophy, “reasonableness” is one of the 
key concepts of contemporary political liberalism where it plays the role of a criterion 
(or of the set of criteria) of appropriateness of certain rationales for the use of coercion 
by the state towards individuals, and thereby is a crucial criterion of the limits of 
legitimacy of the liberal state. 
What is puzzling, however, is that these two currents: the arguments about 
reasonableness in law and in politics, are not considered jointly but rather constitute two 
parallel currents of thought with no common points. As far as I know, there has not been 
any serious attempt two identify the common denominator(s) of these two types of 
“reasonableness”. It is surprising given that the literature on reasonableness both in 
legal theory and in political theory is quite rich, so one would have thought that at least 
some writers would be tempted to consider them jointly. It can hardly be explained by 
the disciplinary separation between legal theory and political philosophy, and the 
inability or unwillingness of the scholars in these two fields to intrude upon each other 
territories. To the contrary, there have been many edifying and impressive examples of 
interdisciplinary work of this kind, but not with regard to reasonableness. 
It may well be that this has been for good reasons; perhaps indeed, the only thing which 
is common to reasonableness in law and reasonableness in politics is the word, and a 
supposition that the commonality of the word reveals the commonality of the 
phenomenon described  by the word might be considered to be a case of a nominalist 
fetishism. (It would be as if someone suspected that there must be some commonality of 
meaning between “game” as a play and “game” as wild animals because of the identity 
of the word). A nominalist error of this sort should be avoided. 
 
                                                 
*
 Professor in the Department of Law, European University Institute in Florence, and in the Faculty of 
Law, University of Sydney. This is a draft of the paper presented to the 11th International Forum on 
Constitutional Review, organized by the Institute of Law and Public Policy and Venice Commission of 
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2 
And yet, the commonality of words which are meant to describe the normative 
constructs in the areas so close to each other and so inter-connected as law and politics, 
should create at least a prima facie presumption that something similar, if not identical, 
is at work there. This is at least worth consideration, and the aim of this paper is to 
initiate a reflection on this. I will proceed as follows: in the first part, I will review the 
uses of category of reasonableness in law; in the second part, the role that 
reasonableness plays in political philosophy, and in conclusion bring these themes 
together and suggest ways in which reasonableness both in law and in politics can be 
seen to respond to the common concerns. 
 
 
1. Reasonableness in Law 
 
I will begin this exploration by an attempt to draw a general “map” of the legal uses of 
the category of reasonableness. By necessity, it will be an extremely vague and general 
survey, but I think that such an account is necessary prior to any attempt to identify, in a 
general way, the main normative consequences of embracing this category in law. 
There can be different taxonomies used in order to systematize such an account. The 
first, and perhaps most obvious taxonomy is based on a distinction between different 
types of legal orders in which the category of reasonableness appears: say, in 
international public law, in the European law, and in various national (domestic) legal 
systems. Just a few examples. In international public law, reasonableness can be found, 
inter alia, in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Art. 32 states that, were the 
regular methods of treaty interpretation to lead to “manifestly absurd or unreasonable” 
outcomes, some “supplementary means of interpretation” may be used.1 This is, 
obviously, not the place to consider the matter of substance; all I want to indicate is that 
here, the category of reasonableness (expressed from the negative angle, that is as 
unreasonableness), plays a role of a certain safety valve the aim of which is to prevent 
consequences which are manifestly undesirable, and yet which would be likely to occur 
if a state used the standard, conventional methods of legal interpretation.2 
The second type of legal order where the category of reasonableness is present is the 
European law, including the law of the European Union, and also the law of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The very text of the ECHR contains 
several references to “reasonableness”: for instance Art. 6 confers upon the citizens of 
the member states the right to fair trial which includes, among other things, the right “to 
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time”; article 5 provides, as one of the 
exceptions to the right to liberty and security, the lawful arrest based on “reasonable 
suspicion” that a person committed an offence or when it can be reasonably considered 
necessary to prevent him committing an offence”, etc. 
                                                 
1
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, UN 
Treaty Series vol. 1155, p. 331. 
2
 For a detailed analysis of this provision which is congruent with my account of Article 32, see Ulf 
Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer: Dordrecht, 2007) at 334-43. 
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3 
The third level at which this category appears is the level of national, or domestic, legal 
orders, and in particular in constitutional and administrative law. In Great Britain, there 
is a principle in the administrative law, dating back to the 1948 Court of Appeal 
Wednesbury decision,3 where the court established that it would only correct an 
administrative decision when (inter alia) the decision was so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority would ever consider taking it. Another example can be provided 
by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: its Article 1 states that the Charter 
rights are guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
reasonably justified in a free and democratic society”. This formula has been adopted in 
a number of legal systems; for example in the South African Constitution an equivalent 
clause (in Art. 36) is that any limits on constitutional rights must be “reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society”. 
The second possible taxonomy is best upon whether the category of reasonableness in a 
legislative act or legal decision.  In other words this becomes a question of authorship – 
how did the category come about in the legal system, by the act of a legislator or the 
decision of a judge?  As examples of the texts of legislative acts where the category of 
reasonableness appears is the afore-mentioned Vienna Convention, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,4 or the 
Constitution of South Africa.5 In contrast, as examples of judge-introduced category of 
reasonableness can be provided by the decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights and several national constitutional courts, which will be in more detail discussed 
below, however, in brief, it will be seen that in the constitutional courts’ reasoning the 
category of reasonableness plays a central role in the analysis of proportionality of the 
legislative means to the legislative aims pursued (or claimed to be pursued) by the 
lawmaker. 
The third - and the most important from the point of view of this paper - distinction is 
based on the functions that the category of reasonableness plays in a given legal context. 
I will distinguish between a “weak” and a “strong” understanding of reasonableness. In 
the weak sense, reasonableness has a role to exclude manifestly unfair or irrational 
consequences of the enforcement of a given legal rule; as I put it already before, the 
reasonableness plays in such circumstances a role of a “safety valve” which prevents the 
occurrence of consequences which strongly and obviously collide with our basic sense 
of justice, fairness, decency, etc. I have provided, above, an example of a British 
administrative-law rule proclaimed in Wednesbury based on which a court may correct 
an administrative decision for its unreasonableness.  
                                                 
3
 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223. 
4 
“The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”, Section I, emphasis added. 
5
 “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom….”, Section 36.1., emphasis added. 
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Also, the Italian administrative law knows the category of “manifesta 
irragionevolezza”,6 or “manifest unreasonableness” which corresponds, roughly, to 
what the US law calls “rational basis scrutiny”: an act can be struck down as unlawful 
by a judge only when the judge considers that there is no rational connection between 
the means adopted by the legislators and the aim pursued. The test is very lenient one: it 
requires only some connection between the means and the ends, and the law is set aside 
only if no connection can be found, however remote and cumbersome. 
This shows why I call this category of reasonableness a “weak” one: it is weak because, 
in practice, its use attacks only a very small number of legal acts. Only extremely 
irrational, arbitrary, unwise legal rules will fall victim to such test of reasonableness: 
most of them will be immune to its critical edge. The “weak” test expresses a high 
degree of deference towards the legislative choices of legal measures, and can be seen 
as relying upon a strong presumption of legality (including of constitutionality) of 
legislative judgments. 
In contrast, “strong” uses of the category of reasonableness have a much harsher critical 
edge towards the legislation under scrutiny, and impose much more demanding 
conditions upon the lawmaker. I will be speaking of the “strong” uses when the test is 
not merely whether the lawmaker has adopted acceptable means related to some 
legitimate (that is, legally admissible) purpose but, in addition, whether there is a 
sufficient relation of proportionality between the means and the ends. In the US 
parlance this would correspond more to b the so-called “strict scrutiny” both the criteria 
related to the aims and to the means-ends relationship are tougher than under the 
rational-basis scrutiny. I call it a “strong” sense of reasonableness because its 
consequence will be to strike down a larger number of law (ceteris paribus) than when a 
weak test of reasonableness is applied. Hence, this stronger meaning of reasonableness 
reveals a weaker presumption of legality (constitutionality) of an act, and removes the 
element of deference of the scrutinizer towards the law maker. 
The reasonableness in this sense is related mainly to the weighing and balancing of 
diverse, often mutually incompatible, values and interests, and consequently, with the 
proportionality analysis. Perhaps the best-known and the most influential example of 
such analysis is a doctrine of the German Bundesverfassungsgerich, or the Federal 
Constitutional Court (FCC) which has long held that the proportionality analysis in the 
process of weighing and balancing of conflicting constitutional values is one of the key 
guarantees of the protection of constitutional rights. This is because such an analysis is 
geared towards making sure that the state will not interfere with individual liberties 
more than absolutely necessary in order to achieve constitutionally legitimate public 
goals. As explained by Paul Craig in the context of the protection of fundamental rights 
by the EU courts:  
                                                 
6
 See Giacinto della Cananea, “Reasonableness in Administrative and Public Law”, unpublished paper 
presented to the conference “Reasonableness in Law”, European University Institute, Florence, 16 
November 2007. 
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“Society might well accept that such rights cannot be regarded as absolute, but the very 
denomination of certain interests as Community rights means that any interference should be 
kept to a minimum. In this sense proportionality is a natural and necessary adjunct to the 
recognition of such rights”.7 
In order to describe this relationship (crucial, for the purposes of this paper) between the 
category of reasonableness on the one hand and the analysis of proportionality of 
legislative means (which may involve some restrictions on constitutional rights) to 
constitutionality valid aims on the other hand, let me suggest a highly stylized and 
extremely simplified account of a dominant (in contemporary constitutional courts’ 
jurisprudence of restrictions of rights) model of such proportionality analysis. This 
stylized account (perhaps, a sort of “ideal model” in Max Weber’s meaning) is based 
mainly on the German Court’s jurisprudence, but also on a number of other 
constitutional courts’ case law (including the Canadian, South Africa, Polish, etc) and - 
last but not least – the European Court of Human Rights, with respect to the Articles 8-
11 and 14 of the Convention. (This last proviso is informed by the fact that, in my view, 
it is mainly with respect to these five Convention articles that the ECtHR has conducted 
a fully-fledged proportionality analysis, due to the textual shape of the Articles, even 
though the weighing and balancing applies, as the ECtHR has long announced, also to 
the interpretation of all other articles of the Convention). The account provided below 
may not fully correspond, pedantically speaking, to any single constitutional court’s 
doctrine, but I believe that it is generally faithful to what I consider to be the dominant 
model, give and take a few marginal local variations. 
The first stage in the reasoning based on proportionality is about the aim (or purpose) of 
a given rule (or law, or regulation, or decision). Is the aim, first, legitimate (that is, does 
it belong to the set of purpose that the state is allowed to try to attain through its 
actions)? Secondly, is it sufficiently important in order to be able to justify the putative 
restrictions of some constitutional rights? (That the means used may impact negatively 
upon constitutional rights is adopted here ex hypothesi; otherwise, the whole 
proportionality analysis would be unnecessary). 
When the answer to these two questions, related to the aims, is positive (which usually 
is the case because it is rather rare to encounter situations when the legislators attempts 
to attain inadmissible aims, or even the aims which cannot be deemed important),8 a 
three-tiered test of proportionality is triggered. The first step is to find out whether the 
means adopted by the lawmaker are suitable (in the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
parlance, “reasonable and demonstrably justified”). Second, the test is whether the 
means adopted limit the constitutional rights in the least restrictive way (“the least 
restrictive means test”). Thirdly, it has to be found our whether the advantages of 
accomplishing the purpose outweigh the disadvantages and costs of restricting the 
specific constitutional rights. At this point it may be noted that, while the second tier 
                                                 
7
 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2006) at 674, emphasis added. 
8
 For a good explication of this proposition, in the context of the scrutiny conducted by the European 
Court of Justice under the fundamental rights test, see Paul Craig: “The fact that any restrictions on the 
right must be justified by some objective of general interests pursued by the Community is … a 
necessary condition for the legality of the measure. It is, however, difficult to regard this as a 
significant hurdle. The very fact that this condition is cast in such general terms … means that it will be 
rare for a measure not to surmount this hurdle”, id. at 678. 
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(the least restrictive means test) may be called the “necessity test” (not quite precisely: 
the point to which I will return below), the third tier which consists of the comparison of 
the costs and benefits of a given legal rule may be labeled “proportionality sensu 
stricto” (we will keep the “proportionality sensu largo label for the entire, three-tiered 
model of reasoning). 
At this point it is necessary to emphasize the link between the category of 
reasonableness underlying, as it does, the entire proportionality analysis, as sketched 
above, and the test of “necessity” located at the second tier of the proportionality model 
sensu largo, i.e. at the crucial point of the scrutiny: the question is whether the means 
used by the lawmaker are indeed the least restrictive ones of all the realistically 
available means of attaining the legislative purpose. From a purely theoretical, or 
analytical, point of view, “reasonableness” is not equivalent to “necessity”: 
reasonableness is a less rigorous requirement which, potentially, admits of a larger 
number of acceptable measures than the requirement of necessity. This is because, while 
we can usually think of a number of measures deemed “reasonable”, there is only one 
measure which we can fairly describe as necessary: if there were more than one 
alternative measures, then none of them would be properly called a “necessary” one. (I 
emphasize the logical point which I am making one: of course, we can have a number of 
measures which are necessary in the sense of their joint presence being necessary to 
achieve a certain consequence. But we cannot have a number of alternative measures 
each of which are “necessary”: this would be a logical nonsense. But it is not a nonsense 
to say that we may think of a number of alternative measures which are all reasonable). 
This is because, if we could think of another measure which is also called necessary, 
then the first measure is not really necessary. The upshot is, while we can think of a 
number of measures which can be described reasonable, we can always think only of 
one measure (or of one set of measures, jointly adopted) which can be described as 
necessary - and in this sense, the test of reasonableness is more lenient than that of 
necessity. 
But this is an excessively abstract argument, and it ignores the obvious truth that 
constitutional adjudication is not a domain of abstract logical reasoning but of practical 
reasons and of political practice. In practice, judgments of reasonableness are very close 
to, if not identical with, those of necessity, and that both these requirements are more or 
less merged into one under the overall umbrella of proportionality analysis by a number 
of constitutional courts. In the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the requirement of 
“necessity” contained in Articles 8-11 of the Convention (namely, that restrictions on 
these rights must be “necessary in a democratic society”)9 has actually acquired a 
meaning synonymous with “proportionality”, or, to be more precise, the test of 
“proportionality” has been found to be an important one in establishing that the 
“necessity” requirement has been met. The ECtHR has established, in a number of 
decisions, an authoritative interpretation of the Convention’s formula “necessary in a 
democratic society”: that the interference with a right must correspond to a “pressing 
                                                 
9
 More precisely, the requirement of necessity is present in: Articles 8-11 of the Convention rights to 
respect for privacy, to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to freedom of expression, and to 
freedom of association and assembly, respectively; Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (liberty of movement 
within a state); and Article 1 of the Protocol No. 7 (right of an alien not to be expelled before certain 
conditions are met). 
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social need” and be “proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”.10 As one 
commentator has noted, “from ‘necessity’ to proportionality is but a small step”,11 and 
this step has repeatedly been made; indeed, the notion of “pressing social need” has 
been authoritatively established as a test for “necessity”. Under this interpretation, 
“necessity” qua proportionality is a rather flexible notion that allows for a relatively 
broad range of measures to be found “necessary” – even if they are not “necessary” in 
the sense of being “indispensable”, or being sine qua non. It is significant that, at times, 
the ECtHR jurisprudence has held that “necessity” is analogous to the requirement that 
the reasons for a restriction be “relevant and sufficient”.12 But the best expression of the 
connection between these three categories: proportionality, reasonableness and 
necessity, can be found in this statement by Chief Justice of the South African Supreme 
Court Arthur Chaskalson, in the 1995 judgment on capital punishment:  
“The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality”.13 
It is worth pondering upon this sentence because one can hardly find, in contemporary 
constitutional jurisprudence, a more lucid and brilliant expression of this connection 
between the ideal of reasonableness, the test of necessity, and the overall proportionality 
analysis which triggers this test (of necessity) , and which gives meaning to this ideal 
(of reasonableness). And it is precisely this connection which is crucial for the main 
argument of this paper. It is because it shows in what ways the “strong” sense of 
reasonableness is fundamentally rights-protective by establishing very rigorous and 
tough requirements for a legislator who wishes (and is obliged to) promote public goals 
which nevertheless implicate possible restrictions of individual rights proclaimed by 
constitutions. 
But, of course, the proportionality analysis based on the ideal of “reasonableness” in the 
strong sense, as just outlined, is not the only judicial method of scrutinizing the 
legislative restrictions of individual constitutional rights known to constitutional judges 
today, nor is it the only method of subjecting legislators to a tough, robust, critical 
judicial scrutiny. The proportionality/reasonableness method can be contrasted with 
(what I will call, with huge simplification) a “US method” which can be called an 
“absolutist” method of scrutiny. Under one (not the only one!) judicial doctrine 
elaborated by the US Supreme Court, constitutional rights have a quasi-absolute 
character; this is because (the argument goes) the US Bill of Rights does not contain (in 
contrast to the European Convention, Canadian Charter, and most of the recent 
constitutions in Europe, South Africa etc) any limiting clauses, any constitutionally 
valid grounds for rights restrictions, and any tests such as “reasonableness”, 
“proportionality” or “necessity” which would provide a judge with a clear guidance as 
                                                 
10
 See e.g. Goodwin v. United Kingdom 22 E.C.H.R. 123, 143-4 (1996); for discussion see Alastair 
Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention of Human Rights (Butterworths, London 
2001) at 411-2, 448. 
11
 Marc-Andre Eissen, quoted by Mowbray, id. at 413. 
12
 See P van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 3rd ed. (Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1998) at 81. 
13
 Constitutional Court Case No. CCT/3/94 (6-6-1995), para. 104.  
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to the acceptable relationship between a ground of restriction and a law under scrutiny. 
It does not follow, of course, that judges using this method invalidate any legislative 
acts which have negative implications for some constitutional rights but rather that the 
very structure of their argument is different from the structure of proportionality-
oriented analysis. In the case of the “US method”, the restrictions upon rights are not so 
much “extrinsic” to those rights (as is the case in proportionality analysis) but rather are 
built into those rights. 
As an example to illustrate these built-in restrictions on rights, consider the typical 
structure of judicial argument about restrictions of freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment. US judges, lacking any constitutional guidance as to the criteria of 
acceptability of restrictions on this right, must engage in an interpretation of the very 
concept “freedom of speech” in order to avoid an absurd consequence of 
constitutionally protecting any speech, no matter what. This interpretation may be based 
on different methods (textual, originalist, “presentist”, teleological, etc) and it may 
apply, independently, to each of the terms: “freedom” and “speech”. So, in order to 
establish some standards for constitutionally acceptable restrictions, one may argue that 
“freedom” is not equivalent to “license”; that, for instance “freedom of speech” does not 
imply that everyone should be legally protected to say, publicly or privately, whatever 
s/he wants because the very notion of “freedom” is normatively colored and so to 
ascertain “freedom of speech” (as opposed to “license to speak”) we need to engage our 
value judgments in order to sketch the contours of such freedom. An even more fertile 
ground for such type of rights-limiting interpretation is with regard to the notion of 
“speech”: it has been a long (and often complex) tradition in the First Amendment 
jurisprudence to establish and clarify that not very verbal behavior is “speech” in the 
First Amendment sense, and that there are some non-verbal types of conduct which 
deserve the rank of “speech” under the First Amendment, even if we conventionally do 
not describe them as speech: this is the case of symbolic conduct such as marches, 
parades, picketing, wearing uniforms or armbands, burning flags etc. All this is based 
on the idea that in order to inquire into the “true” meaning of “speech” as in the 
“freedom of speech” one must ascertain the rationale for protecting this right in the first 
place, and the rationale in this case is connected with the function and meaning of a 
given expressive conduct, whether under the common usage of language it is 
conventionally called “speech” or not.14  
This example shows that under the US model, even though it is based on ostensibly 
“absolutist” understanding of constitutional rights, roughly similar restrictions on rights 
can be justified as under the proportionality analysis. However, the path by which this 
result is attained is quite different. It may be said (again, in a deliberately simplified 
way) that the “absolutist” model presupposes (perhaps ironically) that the real meaning 
of certain constitutional rights (such as “freedom of speech”) is in fact narrower that the 
conventional, common-usage of language would suggest, and therefore that it is the 
judge’s task to reveal this narrower, stricter meaning of the right. Hence, it is not 
necessary to realize (in a proportionality-analysis way) what are the “external” 
constraints upon a given right, such as related to various constitutional public goods and 
other people’s rights) because the “true” meaning of a right in question is sufficiently 
                                                 
14
 See generally Frederick Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press 
1982) at 89-112. 
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narrow that it will not collide with other constitutional values. Hence, the crucial step 
consists in ascertaining those “internal” constraints upon a right, involved as they are in 
the very meaning of a given concept which figures in the constitutional articulation of 
that right. The imagery of an “absolutist” understanding may be maintained because the 
right is indeed “absolute” - but only because it has been already sufficiently restricted in 
its scope of applicability, through the judicial interpretation of its meaning. It is natural 
that, by restricting the scope of a right we minimize the danger of its collision with other 
constitutional values while by enlarging the scope, we increase the incidences of such 
collisions. 
The upshot so far is that the practical consequences of choosing either of the two main 
methods of interpreting the restrictions of constitutional rights may be identical. 
Nevertheless, the moral and political implication of the choice of method may be 
extremely significant. Consider the consequences of adopting the US-style “absolutist” 
method first. One of the consequences is a rather clear division between the winners and 
the losers of any determinate decision.15 It is because, as I have just shown, the court 
must conduct a relatively rigid conceptualization of a given right, and by restricting its 
scope of applicability (in order to avoid collision with other compelling constitutional 
values) it will at the same time implicitly at least rank this right vis-à-vis other rights 
and/or other constitutional values. It means that the parties to the constitutional 
litigations who lost will get a message that their claims were deprived of any 
constitutional value: they may have been prima facie plausible, but after a thorough 
judicial investigation it has been established that their claims have no constitutional 
value at all. This means that, even if they defended their claim in good faith, they have 
been mistaken in believing that their claim is constitutionally worthy. As I have shown 
above, the judicial act of awarding a priority to a particular right-claim in a quasi-
absolute manner is made possible only by a judicial restriction of the scope of the right, 
and once such a limitation of the scope is conducted, there is no room for the 
constitutionally valid claims of the opposed party. So the message for the losing party is 
that it was wrong as to the constitutional worth of its claims, and it is in this sense that, 
as Alec Sweet Stone put it, this method of constitutional interpretation leads to the 
constitutionalization of the division into winners and losers.16 
Proportionality analysis leads to different consequences. But before I give account if 
some positive implications of using proportionality/reasonableness method, let me 
pinpoint what I consider to be the main cost, or negative consequence, of such a 
method, compared to an “absolutist” one. It should be noted that the “absolutist” 
method, despite all the negative consequences just described, has at least one 
fundamental advantage over the alternatives, namely it seems to be perfectly suited to 
what is a paradigmatically judicial function, as contrasted to the legislative function. In 
a traditional, conventional distinction between legislators who make the law and judges 
who apply the law, the use of an absolutist method by a judge seems to be fully 
justified: all the judge is expected to do is to conduct a thorough interpretation of the 
true content of a given right in order to rescue it from a conflict with other constitutional 
                                                 
15
 Similarly Alec Stone Sweet, “Proportionality, Balancing, and Global Constitutionalism”, unpublished 
paper presented to the conference „Reasonableness in Law”, European University Institute, Florence, 
16 November 2007. 
16
 Id. 
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values, that is, other rights and other constitutionally recognized public goals. The need 
to engage in an interpretation is something self-evident and banal, and not even the most 
ardent opponents of “judicial activism” (whatever the term may mean) deny the need 
for the judge to engage in an interpretation, even though, naturally, there may be a wide 
disagreement as to the proper interpretive methods to be used. 
Now let me emphasize that the account provided in the paragraph above is based on 
quite a deliberate over-simplification. We know, after all, that so-called “judicial 
activism” may well be reconciled with an “absolutist” approach to the analysis of 
limitations of constitutional rights, and also, vice versa, that judges who engage in the 
proportionality analysis may be very deferential (hence, non-activist) towards legislative 
choices. A great deal, perhaps everything, depends on the actual method of 
interpretation used by a judge, and some choices of interpretive methods must be made 
both by “absolutist” and by proportionality-oriented judges. So the preceding paragraph 
does not contain my own judgment that an “absolutist” judge in fact is better aligned 
with a conventional view about the proper role of judicial function, but rather captures a 
certain rhetorical advantage of such an “absolutist” method: such method seems to be 
better suited to a judicial function. In the eyes of the general public, political class, non-
legal audience which evaluates and monitors judges’ behavior, the use of an absolutist 
method carries a certain protection for judges against the charges that they intrude upon 
other branches’ privileged domain. This is because we (“we” - the non-lawyers, “we” - 
the public opinion) indeed expect the judges to do just that: to inquire, thoroughly and 
wisely into the true meaning of the legal rules which they are about to apply to concrete 
cases or controversies. If we deny the judges to do that, we in fact deny them the 
authority to do their job.  
The likely public perception of the use of proportionality analysis is quite different. 
When limitations of rights are viewed through the prism of “reasonableness” of those 
limitations, i.e. of the proportionality of those restrictions to the avowed aims of the 
regulation, the method seems to be a par excellence legislative rather than aligned with 
the application of the law; hence, conform more with the law-maker’s than a judge’s 
function. Under a conventional approach, as long as a judge “merely” engages in a 
thorough examination of the true meaning of a right, s/he stays fully and squarely in 
his/her domain, and is doing exactly what is expected from him/her. In contrast, 
proportionality analysis - the analysis of relationship of means to ends - seems to be a 
paradigmatically legislative function. This is for three reasons. First, the task of 
ascertaining and assessing the aim of the legislation is a par excellence legislative task: 
it is the legislators who decide about the aims to be pursued by the law, or the aims of 
citizens that the law is entitled to actively support. And we have seen that the inevitable 
first stage of any proportionality analysis, in the fully-fledged model, is to assess the 
legitimacy and the importance of the aims of a regulation under scrutiny. Second, 
proportionality of the means to the ends is a domain of complex judgments about 
empirically verifiable causal effects in the realm of social processes, hence the domain 
within which judges (under a conventional picture) have no competence, knowledge and 
information. Third - and most importantly - the entire proportionality analysis is (as we 
have seen earlier) underwritten by the idea of weighing and balancing of competing 
values, interests and preferences (recall a quote from Chief Justice Chaskalson). And it 
is precisely the legislators endowed as they are with democratic legitimacy from their 
constituencies who are entrusted with the political task of conducting the act of 
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weighing and balancing, and striking compromises between those competing values, 
interests and preferences. In contrast, the judicial function which fundamentally does 
not rely, and is not supposed to rely, upon the electoral pedigree for its legitimacy, 
seems in compatible with the task of an authoritative weighing and balancing of diverse 
societal interests and values. 
This is the main disadvantage of judicial proportionality analysis, and just as before, I 
must add a clause that the preceding paragraph is an account of the public perception of 
such an analysis rather than my own assessment of it. Nevertheless, such a perception, 
justified or not, is in itself an important fact, and must in itself be factored into our 
evaluation of costs and benefits of alternative methods of adjudication on restrictions of 
constitutional rights. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding this disadvantage, proportionality analysis based on 
reasonableness approach has also some very important advantages, compared to an 
absolutist method. First of all, it is much more “transparent”. A judge engaged in the act 
of weighing and balancing of competing constitutional goods discloses the elements of 
his reasoning to the public. It is, to use an admittedly imperfect analogy, as if a cook in 
an elegant restaurant first revealed to the customers all the ingredients, and then showed 
the guests, step by step all the stages of the preparation of the dish before it lands on 
their tables. By showing all the “ingredients” of his/her reasoning, a judge conducting 
the proportionality analysis indicates that the final conclusion is not a result of a 
mechanical calculus: a syllogism in which the conclusion necessarily follows from the 
premises but rather the outcome results from a complex, practical reasoning, in which 
significant but often mutually competing values have to be considered in their actual 
social context. This practical reasoning, a judge implies, calls for making controversial, 
difficult choices regarding the comparative significance of those competing values in a 
given set of circumstances. As a result, even if some - even many - members of the 
audience disagree with the outcome, they know why it has occurred. (And by the 
audience I mean mainly the parties to a given constitutional litigation but also the 
judicial and legal milieu, the political class, the media and public opinion in general). Of 
course, the fact that they understand it does not follow that they accept it, but the 
understanding of the reasons for a decision is a very important factor in the legitimacy 
of a constitutional judge - legitimacy which is always vulnerable, unstable and 
challengeable, for obvious reasons having to do with the dominant conception of 
democratic legitimacy based on electoral results. So the legitimacy dividend resulting 
from the transparency just described is an important asset for judges always facing the 
notorious, and unavoidable, legitimacy deficit. 
I should also add that the contrast between the “absolutist” and the proportionality-
based methods has been sharpened here deliberately, for argumentative purposes, and 
that in reality the opposition is not so stark. On the one hand, one may show a number 
of “absolutist” judgments which have exemplary clarity and which are perfectly 
intelligible to the non-legal audience, and on the other hand, many proportionality-
oriented judgments which are unduly complex, written in arcane and difficult language, 
and unintelligible to non-lawyers (and often to lawyers as well). But when I talk about 
“transparency” I mean not so much intelligibility, in terms of availability to a large 
number of reasonable intelligent people, but rather the fact that a good proportionality-
oriented reasoning should contain a list of all the “ingredients” (in terms of mutually 
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competing values) - while the absolutist reasoning, not necessarily. As such, 
proportionality analysis is more conducive to critical analysis and to dissection of its 
elements than the “absolutist” analysis which focuses on one constitutional right and on 
a thorough examination of its meaning. 
But the primary advantage of proportionality analysis is its capacity for consensus 
building. Note that it is inherent to this method of reasoning that a judge must admit that 
both parties to the controversy has prima facie good constitutional arguments, and that 
no party is beyond the constitutional pale. When we conduct the weighing and 
balancing of competing constitutional value, we recognize the value to them all, 
including to the “losing” ones. If I have lost in this exercise, i.e. if my value has been 
recognized as less weighty in this particular constellation of values, it does not follow 
that it has been denied any value: it has just had to give way to another value or set of 
values. Constitutionality of all these values is preserved. More specifically: under the 
analysis of proportionality of means (rights restrictions) to legislative aims, a judge who 
ends up by striking down a given regulation is saying that those means are not 
sufficiently proportional (relevant) to the attainment of the aim, which may mean either 
that (1) the aim is not sufficiently weighty in order to justify such a rights restriction, or 
that (2) the cost of trying to find some other means to attain the end may be lower than 
the costs adopted by the legislator in the regulation under scrutiny (the costs consisting 
in the rights restrictions). In both these conclusions, the aims (in conclusion #1) and the 
means adopted (in conclusion #2) maintain some constitutional value - but not 
sufficiently high in order to justify a given restriction, i.e. lower than the value of 
avoiding this rights restriction. The upshot is that the arguments invoked in the litigation 
by an eventually “losing” party maintain their value, though in this constellation, a 
lower one than the values invoked by the “winning” party. (And, mutatis mutandis, the 
same would be the upshot of a judgment upholding a given regulation: the complaining 
party will not be told that it was mistaken as to the constitutional values which it 
invoked against the regulation but only that, in this particular context, the value of 
attaining the goal through the means adopted by the legislator outweighs the costs 
resulting from the rights restriction). 
So if we were to articulate a message sent by the court which has just conducted a 
proportionality analysis and ended up with a determinate judgment, it would go roughly 
like that: “Both parties to the controversy had some constitutionally valid arguments but 
we, the court, must choose a lesser evil and in this case we believe that the arguments of 
one party constitutionally prevail over the arguments invoked by the other party”. This 
is a conciliatory argument, consensus-seeking and “wounds healing” - the wounds 
inevitably resulting from the unavoidable fact that one of the parties will lose. This 
argument implies, as Alec Stone puts it, “ritual bows to the losing party”.17 In addition, 
the message resulting from such an argument may well contain an implicit promise that, 
in future, the presently losing party may prevail, if only the actual context will slightly 
change, thus affecting the reconfiguration of all relevant constitutional values at stake. 
The weighing and balancing, resulting from complex practical judgments rather from a 
mechanical syllogism, may bring about a different outcome, because the judge may well 
assess that the cost/benefit calculus will be only slightly different - and this slight 
difference may make all the difference. So there is a consolation for the losing party: it 
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is a hope that it may win in the future, and that today’s decision does not entrench its 
loss forever. In such a way, by building the grounds for consensus and by immediately 
healing the wounds resulting from the decision, a proportionality-oriented judge 
additionally enhances its legitimacy, damaged as it has been by a legislative-like way of 
proceeding. 
 
 
2. Reasonableness in Political Philosophy 
 
In liberal political philosophy, the category of “reasonableness” plays a crucial role, 
especially in relation to the question of political legitimacy, i.e. the question of the 
grounds for using state coercion towards those who do not necessarily agree with the 
content of the authoritative directive which is being applied to them. The most elaborate 
discussion of reasonableness in the context of political legitimacy has been provided by 
John Rawls, and it his theory which serves here as the basis of my short discussion of 
reasonableness in politics. 
Rawls distinguishes between two contiguous concepts: rationality and reasonableness, 
as two separate moral powers which jointly constitute a full moral physiognomy of a 
human self.18 To say it very briefly, Rawls’s “reasonableness”: is about those moral 
capacities which allow us it to “propose principles and standards as fair terms of 
cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise 
do so”,19 “rationality” in contrast applies to a single agent and is about forming, 
shaping, modifying and following our conception of the good. So to put it very 
simplistically, rationality is about the moral good for an individual person while 
reasonableness is about the moral bases of collaboration of an individual with the 
others, on the grounds whish are acceptable to others. 
This last statement leads to the central category in Rawls’s political philosophy, namely 
Public Reason (PR) which is tied up with the liberal principle of legitimacy which 
postulates that only laws that are based upon arguments and reasons to which no 
members of the society have a rational reason to object can boast political legitimacy, 
and as such be applied coercively even to those who actually disagree with them. In 
Rawls’s words: ‘Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised 
in accordance with the constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
their common human reason’.20 This is based on a simple point: a law cannot claim any 
legitimacy towards me if it is based upon arguments and reasons that I have no reason to 
accept. The denial of legitimacy to such a law is based on the view that there must be 
some connection between the law and myself qua subject of the law – a connection that 
establishes some rational reasons to identify the good for myself in the law. The 
connection must be between the substance of the law and the preferences, desires, 
convictions or interests of each individual subjected to it. If, under rational examination, 
no such connection can be detected, then I have no reasons to accept the law as 
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legitimate. If, however, I disagree with the wisdom of a given law but would agree that 
it is based upon arguments that I can recognize as valid, then a necessary condition for 
its legitimacy has been met. This point has been expressed well by Jeremy Waldron: ‘If 
there is some individual to whom a justification cannot be given, then so far as he is 
concerned the social order had better be replaced by other arrangements, for the status 
quo has made out no claim to his allegiance’.21 As is clear, the category of PR serves to 
limit the range of rationales - of reasons - which can be invoked to justify (hence, 
legitimize) the proposed uses of coercion towards individuals. The very idea of “public 
reason”, as expounded by Rawls, is not self-explanatory, and not without its difficulties. 
Rawls operates with two understandings of public reason which are not necessarily 
equivalent. The first one is revealed in the “equal endorseability by all” criterion; the 
second, in his extended distinction between political and comprehensive conceptions, 
with the proviso that public reason must safely place itself within the former. As to the 
first understanding, Ronald Dworkin has expressed doubts as to whether public reason, 
so understood (in Dworkin’s interpretation it is characterized as the “doctrine of 
reciprocity”), excludes anything at all. As Dworkin argues:  
“If I believe that a particular controversial moral position is plainly right … then how can I not 
believe that other people in my community can reasonably accept the same view, whether or 
not it is likely that they will accept it?”22  
The second formulation of public reason in Rawls is even more problematic. This is the 
requirement of locating public reason within the arguments that can be properly 
considered “political” (hence, positioned within an overlapping consensus) as opposed 
to comprehensive ones. This, in turn, seems to be a much too rigorous requirement, 
compared to intuitively acceptable common practices: to consistently purge public 
debate from all the political proposals made on (controversial) moral or religious 
grounds would lead to an undue erosion of public discourse, and would carry obvious 
discriminatory dangers. 
So we have a dilemma: we may identify two alternative readings of PR but under the 
first reading, it is much too lenient while under the second reading - much too rigorous, 
compared to our commonsensical understandings of the reasonableness in public 
discourse. Does it fully disqualify the very idea of PR to play a role in a test for the 
legitimacy of law? I do not think so. The contrast between two readings, just provided, 
has been excessively sharpened, and I hope that a more sensitive reading of PR need not 
lead to such unwholesome consequences. As to the first horn of the dilemma - that PR is 
a much too lenient test which will not be capable of disqualifying virtually any 
regulations - it should be noted, that the very fact that someone sincerely considers his 
or her publicly provided rationale as reasonable, hence universalizable, does not 
necessarily mean that this view is justified from the point of view of an external 
observer. Some types of rationales for legal regulations may be viewed as not 
universalizable by their very nature, and so not lending themselves for figuring in the 
justifications of legal coercive rules. Perhaps all religious justifications are by their very 
nature not “endorseable by all”, because those who are not adherents to a given faith 
have no reason whatsoever to endorse a rationale which crucially is based on that faith. 
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It may well be the case that every believer is confident that his/her beliefs are truly 
reasonable, and that they are so self-evidently reasonable that every reasonable person 
must accept them. But this is not necessarily the only conviction accompanying 
religious beliefs: if, for example, someone believes in revelation as a source of religious 
faith then naturally that person cannot maintain that every reasonable person has good 
reasons to accept the views based on that faith. So these religious beliefs cannot become 
part of PR - and so the very conception of PR is not as toothless as this horn of the 
dilemma would imply. 
We can extend this type of argument upon the second horn of the dilemma as well; it 
was, you remember, that PR is much too rigorous a test because it would disqualify 
many more justifications, compared to our intuitions or common sense. This second 
reading of PR was based on hostility towards admitting “comprehensive”, 
philosophical-religious arguments into the domain of public discourse, in order to be 
able to construct “overlapping consensus”. At the same time it is intuitively feasible that 
participants to the public discourse about law should be able - indeed, even encouraged 
- to cite and appeal to their deep philosophical conceptions, based on certain views of 
the universe, society and individual self. This suggests that the concept of “overlapping 
consensus”, if it is to inform a plausible model of PR, must undergo some modifications 
and refinements in order to make it compatible with widespread liberal-democratic 
intuitions. It seems to me that the very fact of citing or appealing to a deep philosophical 
rationale cannot disqualify a given argument from figuring in the PR - that borders on 
the absurd. Rather what matters is that we pout forward only such proposals for a 
coercive law which may be accepted even by people who do not share our deep 
philosophical views - which in practice means that these proposals must be able of 
being defended also on some other grounds. This seems realistic and feasible; after all, 
most legal rules seem to be able to benefit from different philosophical (and other) 
rationales. Consequently, the second horn of our dilemma appears to be less damaging 
to the idea of PR than it might seem at first blush. 
It is time to aim at some conclusions regarding the functions of the notion of 
reasonableness in political philosophy. As mentioned earlier, it has a special role in the 
context of the issue of legitimacy of political power, i.e. of the use of coercion towards 
individuals. Let me elaborate on this connection now. The issue of legitimacy arises in 
political philosophy, from the individual citizen’s perspective when she asks herself a 
question why she should comply with a directive issued by an authority if she disagrees 
with the content of this directive. More specifically, this question arises in the context of 
legitimacy when a persons contemplates her moral duty to comply: if all that she 
wondered about was a legal duty, the question would be uninteresting, because 
tautological. Similarly, if she inquired only about a practical, in particular about the 
prudential reasons for compliance, the question would not amount to the matter of 
legitimacy but rather would collapse into practical guidelines regarding avoidance of 
sanctions for non-compliance. But the moral question is different from the legal and 
from the practical one: it is a grand question (perhaps, the grand question) of political 
philosophy going back to Jean Jacques Rousseau: how can we reconcile our individual 
freedom with subjection to the “general will” (however defined, as long as the “general 
will” does not necessarily translate fully our individual preferences into the collective 
choice)? So it is a question about the sources of the public authority, and of its 
dominance over the individual; it is a question of the grounds of the duty of obedience 
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to law by the citizens. Liberals admit, of course, that this duty to obey is not unlimited – 
hence the acceptance of some room for civil disobedience – but they cannot go as far as 
to say that the duty to obey should be confined only to those authoritative directives 
with which we agree, on merits. It would be an anarchistic position, and the very fact of 
the lawfulness of a given directive would not add any weight to the argument in favor of 
compliance. 
From this point of view, the concept of “legitimacy” serves as a marker to identify the 
point on a continuum between two extreme: the authoritarian position under which the 
very fact of authoritative enactment of a directive is a sufficient moral reason for 
compliance with it, and on the other side of the spectrum, an anarchistic position under 
which the very fact of legal enactment does not add any weight to moral arguments for 
compliance. Under a liberal approach, the fact of legal enactment is an argument for 
compliance (and in this, it is aligned to the authoritarian position), but is its not a 
sufficient reason and the duty of compliance is not absolute (and in this, it is aligned 
with an anarchistic position). The intermediate space which is occupied by a liberal 
position implies that there is a duty to comply with at least some authoritative rules 
which are not substantively accepted by a given person – and it is precisely the task if 
this idea of legitimacy to determine what are the criteria, grounds and scope of a moral 
duty to comply with those rules. 
As we all know, political philosophy has in store a large number of theories trying to 
provide such criteria and grounds for the duty to comply with the rules we do not 
necessarily endorse substantively. Two recently most influential theories are by appeals 
to the idea of social contract and to deliberative democracy. The conception of Public 
Reason, as described above, attempts to reconcile both these argumentative strategies. 
From the idea of social contract it borrows a centrality of consensus which seems to be a 
foundation of authoritative social arrangements: we owe respect to authoritative 
decisions insofar as, and because, we can be seen to be their co-authors. This is only a 
hypothetical consensus, though, and a very thin one, based on the alleged common 
normative presuppositions implicit in the political culture. In turn, deliberative 
democracy also informs the idea of PR by insisting that the authoritative decisions, in 
order to be legitimate, must be justified (in both senses of the word: both actually 
justifies and justifiable) to those who are bound by them. Just as with the consensus 
(social contract), this is a very thin notion of deliberation in which justifiability is pretty 
much a sufficient condition even though a liberal, of course, will hope that the 
authoritative decisions will be not only capable of being justified but also actually 
argued, discussed and justified in public dialogue. Nevertheless PR, per se, is reducible 
to justifiability of authoritative decisions. To sum up: reasonableness of political 
decisions, understood through the category of Public Reason, means a search for a 
consensus about those decisions by making sure that they are based on the rationales 
which are justifiable to everyone, including to those who disagree with those decisions 
on merits. 
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Conclusions 
 
In the Introduction to this paper I have flagged up a possibility that reasonableness in 
legal reasoning and reasonableness in politics are two completely distinct categories, 
and the only commonality they have is the word. If that were the case, any search for a 
common denominator would be a result of a simple nominalist error. I hope that this 
paper has given some reasons to believe that it is not the case, and that the identity of 
the word may be a helpful indication of a functional similarity of the functions played 
by the category of reasonableness in these two contexts; the functional similarity which 
is underwritten by some common value-judgments on which this category is based. So 
it all boils down to a normative rationale provided for reasonableness in a legal and in a 
political context. 
Let me recapitulate. I have established that in the context of legal theory, the category of 
reasonableness informs this factor of legal reasoning which may have either a weak 
meaning, of a “security valve” which allows judges to get rid of manifestly irrational or 
absurd decisions, which is of lesser importance to us, or – in its “strong” meaning – 
triggers a proportionality analysis, i.e. the proportionality of means to ends, where the 
“means” consist in restrictions of constitutional rights, and the “ends” are about 
constitutionally permissible aims pursued by the legislator. “Strong” reasonableness is 
therefore inherently lied up with proportionality, and also with the test of necessity, and 
thus is a guarantee of a minimal restriction of constitutional rights compatible with the 
attainment of a given purpose. This approach is one among many judicial approaches to 
the scrutiny of restrictions of constitutional rights; not the only one, and not necessarily 
the most libertarian one. It carries certain disadvantages because of an unfortunate 
alignment of the judicial role with the role of legislator whose classical and generally 
recognized role is to conduct a complex weighing and balancing of competing social 
values, interests and preferences. But the proportionality approach also has some great 
advantages when compared with alternative approaches: it is more transparent when it 
comes to revealing to the public all the ingredients of the judicial calculus, and most 
importantly, it reduces the sense of defeat for the losing party. As such, it is consensus-
oriented because it acknowledges explicitly that there are valid constitutional arguments 
on both sides, and that the arguments outweighed by the opposing ones do not lose 
thereby their constitutional weight. 
In turn in the political philosophy the notion of reasonableness registers primarily in the 
liberal theory and applies to the determination of the standards of justifications for 
authoritative decisions so that they can be considered legitimate, i.e. calling for respect 
even from those subjected to them who do not agree with them on merits.23 Such 
justifications can be seen to reflect the reciprocity principle which can be seen as a 
version (albeit a weak one) of hypothetical social contract: it demands that only such 
rationales be provided for authoritative directives which can be endorsed by everyone to 
whom they are addressed. The attractiveness of this idea results from the fact that it 
combines two enormously popular traditions in democratic theory: those of social 
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contract and of deliberative democracy. In general, the idea of political legitimacy based 
on reasonableness is an important guarantee of liberty (because, treated seriously, it 
limits the scope of possible rationales for legitimate coercive decisions) and also of 
equality (because, by resting on the reciprocity principle it requires that everyone should 
be registered in the rationale provided for this authoritative decision). 
So it can be seen that both these conceptions: reasonableness in law and reasonableness 
in political theory have some obvious commonalities at the level of their deep 
justifications; both appeal (in the ways I depicted) to liberal, egalitarian and consensus-
oriented values. This is not to say that there are no important differences between the 
two conceptions. But my aspiration in this paper is to reveal the similarities which, in 
my view, have been overlooked in the conventional discourse on reasonableness, both 
in legal and in political theory. This aspiration, if accomplished, may be a confirmation 
of the hypothesis, flagged at the outset, that the similar word may be a helpful indication 
of the functional similarity. This hypothesis may, in turn, be conducive to interesting 
normative considerations: it may help us defend the use of proportionality analysis in 
law by appealing to the, antecedently accepted, political legitimacy based on 
reasonableness. Or vice versa: it may help us exploit the attractiveness of 
proportionality analysis in law in order to defend the idea of political legitimacy based 
on reasonableness. Either way, the category of reasonableness may be a helpful tool for 
consensus-seeking in the society marked by a deep disagreement as to fundamental 
moral values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
